## DDCI'S TALK TO DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE COURSE 18 September 1967

THE INVITATION TO SPEAK TO THE ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE COURSE SPECIFIED THAT I SHOULD DISCUSS THE FUNCTIONS, ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE REST OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN SUPPORT OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

I UNDERSTAND THAT LAST FRIDAY YOU HEARD TALKS ON THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THROUGH THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD AND THE USIB COMMITTEES, AND THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD. WITH YOUR PRIOR EXPOSURE TO THESE SUBJECTS IN MIND, I WILL TRY TO BUILD ON-RATHER THAN REPEAT—WHAT YOU HAVE ALREADY HEARD, SO AS TO GIVE THE GROUP AN OVERALL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CIA, AND ITS ROLE WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE.

CIA IS NOW ABOUT 20 YEARS OLD. I WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AGENCY DURING ITS INFANCY, AND I HAVE WATCHED ITS EVOLUTION, AS WELL AS CHANGES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

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OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, IN MY JUDGMENT, NOW STAND AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH. WHILE WE DO NOT HAVE AS MUCH IN-FORMATION ON CERTAIN VITAL SUBJECTS AS WE WOULD LIKE IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT, OUR NATIONAL POLICY-MAKERS AND PLANNERS, WE ARE BY NO MEANS BADLY OFF.

THE CIA WAS CREATED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, WHICH GAVE THE CIA FIVE FUNCTIONS. HERE I WOULD LIKE TO QUOTE TO YOU THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE LAW:

"FOR THE PURPOSE OF COORDINATING THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE SEVERAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY, IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE AGENCY, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL--

- "(1) TO ADVISE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IN MATTERS CONCERNING SUCH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES AS RELATE TO NATIONAL SECURITY;
- "(2) TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NATIONAL

  SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE COORDINATION OF SUCH INTELLI
  GENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE

  GOVERNMENT AS RELATE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY;
- "(3) TO CORRELATE AND EVALUATE INTELLIGENCE
  RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY, AND PROVIDE FOR THE
  APPROPRIATE DISSEMINATION OF SUCH INTELLIGENCE WITHIN
  THE GOVERNMENT USING WHERE APPROPRIATE EXISTING

-2-SECRET AGENCIES AND FACILITIES: PROVIDED, THAT THE AGENCY SHALL HAVE NO POLICE, SUBPOENA, LAW-ENFORCEMENT POWERS, OR INTERNAL-SECURITY FUNCTIONS: PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL CONTINUE TO COLLECT, EVALUATE, CORRELATE, AND DISSEMINATE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE: AND PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE;

- "(4) TO PERFORM, FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE EXISTING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, SUCH ADDITIONAL SERVICES
  OF COMMON CONCERN AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
  DETERMINES CAN BE MORE EFFICIENTLY ACCOMPLISHED CENTRALLY;
- "(5) TO PERFORM SUCH OTHER FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES RELATED TO INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY FROM TIME TO TIME DIRECT."

As I am sure you recognize, these statutory authorities—like many public laws—are set forth in very broad terms. However, further definition and refinement was provided for by the Congress in the statutory provision that CIA make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of intelligence activities related to national security. These recommendations have resulted in the series of classified

PAPERS, APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT, CALLED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES. THE NSCIDS ESTABLISH THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND USIB FUNCTION, AND THEY SET OUT CERTAIN ASSIGNMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY AMONG THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

THE FIRST ONE, NSCID #1, ALSO PROVIDES FOR STILL FURTHER DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES, WHICH NOW TOTAL SOME 30-PLUS. I COULD NOT BEGIN TO ACQUAINT YOU WITH ALL THE DETAILS COVERED BY THE NSCIDS AND DCIDS. BUT THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THEY REPRESENT A MEANS FOR CIA AND THE REST OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO UPDATE AND ADJUST TO THE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES, NEEDS AND CHALLENGES FACING U.S. INTELLIGENCE.

AS JUST ONE EXAMPLE, DCID 2/7, WHICH SET UP THE USIB COMMITTEE ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE, OR COMOR, WAS REPLACED THIS PAST JULY FIRST BY DCID 1/14. This Directive brought into operation a new Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, which took over most of COMOR's functions and moved into the vital and increasingly complex field of requirements for imagery interpretation. My point is that we are not standing still in the face of New problems and challenges.

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Against this general background and what you have heard about the Intelligence Community and the USIB, I would now like to describe CIA's functions and operations.

THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY CIA FALL INTO THESE BROAD CATEGORIES:

COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE;
COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS; AND
PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE.

WE FIND IT CONVENIENT TO FURTHER DIVIDE CIA'S INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES IN THREE MAIN GROUPINGS WHICH REFLECT DIFFERENT MEANS OF ACQUISITION. THE FIRST IS OVERT COLLECTION WHICH, AS THE NAME SUGGESTS, COVERS INFORMATION SECURED BY OPEN OR NON-CLANDESTINE MEANS. OVERT COLLECTION INCLUDES THE MONITORING OF FOREIGN RADIOS, SUCH AS RADIO MOSCOW AND THE VOICE OF THE ARABS IN CAIRO. THIS IS DONE BY THE FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE,

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As you all know, CIA also conducts covert

AS YOU ALL KNOW, CIA ALSO CONDUCTS COVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. THESE OPERATIONS INCLUDE AGENT PENETRATIONS, SURREPTITIOUS ACQUISITION OF DOCUMENTS, AND THE USE OF AUDIO DEVICES OR "BUGS."

COVERT COLLECTION CAN ALSO BE DISTINGUISHED BY PURPOSE. IN CIA, WE USE THE TERM ESPIONAGE TO REFER TO THE COLLECTION OF POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE TERM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHEN WE SEEK TO FRUSTRATE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGAINST THE U.S. OR OUR ALLIES, OR TO PROTECT OUR COLLECTION OPERATIONS FROM BEING COUNTERED OR ROLLED UP BY THE ENEMY.

A THIRD TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IS TECHNICAL COLLECTION, WHICH GENERALLY INCLUDES THE USE OF
SENSOR DEVICES. CIA SUPPLEMENTS THE COLLECTION OF
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE OF THE SERVICE CRYPTOLOGIC
AGENCIES IN CERTAIN CASES WHERE THEY ARE NOT ABLE
TO OPERATE. CIA ALSO PARTICIPATES IN THE NATIONAL
PROGRAM OF COLLECTING PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE BY
AIRCRAFT AND SATELLITES.

THE NEXT PRIMARY MISSION OF CIA IS COVERT ACTION, WHICH CONSISTS OF OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN SUPPORT OF U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES, BUT IN WHICH THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS

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HIDDEN. IN THE "COLD WAR," WHICH HAS EXISTED LONGER
THAN THERE HAS BEEN A CIA, WE FACE AN ENEMY ADEPT
AT CONSPIRACY AND SUBVERSION, WITH WORLDWIDE CLANDESTINE ASSETS, SKILLED AGENTS, AND NO COMPUNCTION
ABOUT UNDERMINING OR OVERTHROWING ANY GOVERNMENT WHICH
RESISTS THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM.

THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS IMPORTANT FOR
THE UNITED STATES TO COUNTER THESE COMMUNIST EFFORTS
BY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS. THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY
BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ASHAMED OF EITHER
THE OBJECTIVES OR THE METHODS. IT IS PRIMAPILY BECAUSE
IT SOMETIMES TAKES CLANDESTINE METHODS TO BEAT CLANDESTINE METHODS—JUST AS A KILLER SUBMARINE IS ONE
OF THE BEST WEAPONS TO USE AGAINST ANOTHER SUBMARINE.

This is the shadowy, twilight zone of Government operations that Congress had in mind when it directed CIA to perform "such other services" as the National Security Council might direct.

OUR CRITICS WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT EVER SINCE CONGRESS GAVE THIS AUTHORITY IN 1947, CIA HAS DONE AS IT PLEASED, WITHOUT REGARD TO OFFICIAL POLICIES OR OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND SOMETIMES IN DIAMETRIC OPPOSITION TO THOSE POLICIES.

WHENEVER THE CIA CARRIES OUT A COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS OVERSEAS, IT IS WITH THE PRIOR APPROVAL

OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY

COUNCIL. This committee is chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, representing the President. He meets once a week—

or more often if necessary—with the Director of Central Intelligence and representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense—normally the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

EACH COVERT ACTION OPERATION WHICH THE AGENCY
IS GOING TO CONDUCT OVERSEAS, WHETHER IT IS POLITICAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, OR EVEN PARAMILITARY, IS
PRESENTED TO THIS COMMITTEE. IT EITHER WINS THE
UNANIMOUS APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTEE, OR IT DOES NOT
TAKE PLACE.

WHEN SUCH COVERT OPERATIONS ARE APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THESE OPERATIONS ARE NOT GOING TO BE CONTRARY TO—OR OUTSIDE OF—THE GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY.

THE THIRD PRIMARY MISSION OF CIA IS TO PRODUCE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND TO PROVIDE FOR ITS DISSEMINATION. AN EARLIER SPEAKER HAS DISCUSSED WITH YOU THE PREPARATION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, OR NIES, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO ADD

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SEVERAL POINTS ON THE SUBJECT.

These estimates are generally drafted by the Office of National Estimates which is a part of CIA, but they are National Intelligence Estimates. They must, therefore, reflect the considered judgment of the entire Intelligence Community. This is ensured through the participation of all appropriate elements of the community, through the contribution of facts and judgments, in the revising of the papers in draft, and by the USIB review of the final product. The objective of each estimate is a careful and thoughtful set of judgments which will be of the greatest possible assistance to the policy maker.

I WANT TO STRESS THAT THE MEN ENGAGED IN ARRIVING AT AN ESTIMATE ARE NOT STRIVING FOR UNANIMITY.

IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE UNANIMITY BY OVERRIDING THE DISSENTING MINORITY, OR BY WATERING DOWN
THE ESTIMATE TO THE LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR OF A
NARROW AREA OF COMPLETE AGREEMENT BY THE ENTIRE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. SUCH UNANIMITY, HOWEVER,
WOULD BE A DISSERVICE TO THE POLICY MAKER AND THE
PLANNER.

WHAT IS ASKED IS THAT THE DISSENTS ARE BASED
ON HONEST DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER HOW THE AVAILABLE FACTS ARE TO BE EVALUATED AND INTERPRETED--

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NOT ON PERSONAL CONVICTIONS, HUNCHES, OR PAROCHIAL INTERESTS. WITHIN THIS FRAME OF REFERENCE, IT IS POLICY TO ENCOURAGE WELL-FOUNDED DISSENTS.

THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES DESERVES SPE-CIAL MENTION.

AS ESTABLISHED

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BY GENERAL SMITH WHEN HE WAS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN 1950, IT IS A BODY OF SENIOR, KNOWLEDGEABLE MEN OF VARIED EXPERIENCE, WHO HAVE NO OTHER DUTY THAN TO STUDY AND SEEK ANSWERS TO THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, THE BOARD IS COMPOSED OF ABOUT FIFTEEN MEN WITH EXTENSIVE BACKGROUNDS IN THE MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, LEGAL, ACADEMIC, AND INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONS. THEIR SOLE FUNCTION IS TO HEAR AND CONSIDER EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT FROM THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THESE JUDGMENTS ARE THEN PRESENTED TO THE DIRECTOR AND TO USIB, AND NORMALLY HAVE GREAT WEIGHT IN THE ESTIMATES THE DIRECTOR SUBMITS TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS ON MATTERS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

You may have heard of the related series of papers, called <u>National Intelligence Planning</u>

<u>Projections</u>, which are not very well known. These

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PROJECTIONS ARE WRITTEN BY THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF CIA, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF DIA, FOR THE USE OF THE LONG-RANGE PLANNERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. IN THESE PROJECTIONS, THE ESTIMATORS ARE CALLED UPON TO COME UP WITH HARD FIGURES ON JUST HOW MANY POLARIS-TYPE SUBMARINES, OR ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SITES, OR A CERTAIN TYPE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE, THE SOVIET UNION COULD HAVE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS IN, SAY, OCTOBER 1976 OR JUNE 1978. PROJECTIONS THIS FAR INTO THE FUTURE LEAVE THE CURRENT BASE OF EVIDENCE QUITE FAR BEHIND AND ARE, IN EFFECT, A SETTING FORTH OF DETAILED PLANS FOR THE SOVIET DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE THE RESPONSIBLE RUSSIANS HAVE TO DO SO. I MIGHT ADD THAT THESE PROJECTIONS HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED.

IN ADDITION TO NATIONAL ESTIMATES, CIA PRODUCES A NUMBER OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS.

These include what we call <u>Basic intelligence</u>

which is the durable type of Bread-And-Butter fact

you find in the <u>National Intelligence Survey--</u>

the railroad system, the number of ports, the po
lice machinery, the military forces of a particular country.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS DESIGNED NOT ONLY
TO ALERT THE DECISION-MAKER TO AN INCIPIENT CRISIS.

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BUT ALSO TO FILL HIM IN ON ANY GAPS WHICH MAY HAVE

DEVELOPED IN HIS BASIC AND ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE

SINCE THOSE DOCUMENTS WERE COMMITTED TO PRINT. CIA'S

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS DISSEMINATED IN DAILY AND

WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS, SPECIAL MEMORANDA, AND SITUATION REPORTS ON CRISIS TOPICS.

OTHER TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION INCLUDE
THE RESEARCH STUDY, SUCH AS ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS
SECTORS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY, OR OF THE COSTS OF
SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE SUBJECT OF THESE
STUDIES VARY WIDELY, AND THEY ARE OFTEN PRODUCED
IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS.

FINALLY, THERE IS IMAGERY INTERPRETATION, WHICH FEEDS INTO THE VARIOUS FORMS OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION WHICH I HAVE DESCRIBED. THIS WORK IS CONDUCTED IN THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER WHICH EXAMINES FILMS IN DETAIL AND INTERPRETS WHAT IS TO BE SEEN. THE NPIC IS ADMINISTERED BY THE CIA IN CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH THE DIA.

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IN ADDITION TO THE CIA'S THREE PRIMARY MISSIONS	

IN ADDITION TO THE CIA'S THREE PRIMARY MISSIONSINTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, COVERT ACTION, AND PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE--THE AGENCY ALSO UNDERTAKES
A NUMBER OF RELATED OR SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES. THESE
INCLUDE OUR REFERENCE SERVICES, AUTOMATIC DATA
PROCESSING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE FAMILY
OF SUPPORT SERVICES--PERSONNEL, TRAINING, FINANCE,
AND SO ON, I WILL GO INTO THESE A BIT MORE LATER.

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Now let's turn to the <u>organization</u> of CIA.

The Agency is divided into four principal groupings—
REFERRED to as Directorates—and several staff or
SPECIAL FUNCTIONS THE HEADS OF WHICH REPORT DIRECTLY
TO THE DIRECTOR, SUCH AS THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE
GENERAL COUNSEL AND THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
WHICH I DISCUSSED EARLIER. THE BOX ON THE UPPER
RIGHT OF THIS CHART—NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
EVALUATION—REPRESENTS A SMALL STAFF WHICH ASSISTS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN HIS DUTIES AS
COORDINATOR OF ALL U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI—
TIES. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE RECEIVED A TALK ON
THIS FUNCTION.

Now for the Directorates. The DDI, or Intelligence Directorate, is the principal producer of substantive intelligence. The Directorate of Intelligence also is responsible for overt intelligence collection. The NPIC--which I discussed Earlier--and the Agency's reference services round out the Intelligence Directorate.

THE NEXT DIRECTORATE IS THE DDP OR PLANS DIRECTO-RATE WHICH IS ANOTHER WAY OF REFERRING TO CIA'S CLAN-DESTINE SERVICES. THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES CONDUCT ESPIONAGE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS.

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THE DDP OR CLANDESTINE SERVICES ARE ORGANIZED IN A SERIES OF AREA DIVISIONS, SIMILAR TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REGIONAL BUREAUS; STAFFS FOR SPECIALIZED MATTERS SUCH AS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, COVERT ACTION AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; AND OUR CLANDESTINE UNITS ABROAD WHICH ARE CALLED "STATIONS." THE PLANS DIRECTORATE AND THE HEADS OF OUR OVERSEAS STATIONS ALSO SUPPORT THE DIRECTOR IN HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR CO-ORDINATION OF COVERT COLLECTION OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY OTHER U.S. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS.

THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AS THE NAME SUGGESTS, CONCENTRATES ON THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING R & D FOR TECHNICAL COLLECTION OPERATIONS AND PRODUCTION OF SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE ON THE S & T CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN NATIONS. THIS DIRECTORATE ALSO HOUSES OUR CENTRAL ELECTRONIC COMPUTER CENTER. THERE ARE A FEW S & T ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE DDS & T, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NPIC HANDLES ITS OWN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ENGINEERING FOR PHOTO INTERPRETATION EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, DDS & T CONSOLIDATES AND PASSES MUSTER ON ALL R & D PROGRAMS WITHIN THE AGENCY.

THE FOURTH DIRECTORATE IS THE SUPPORT DIRECTORATE, WHICH EMBRACES THE SUPPORT SERVICES, SUCH AS SECURITY,

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TRAINING, COMMUNICATIONS, FINANCE, PROCUREMENT, PERSONNEL, PRINTING AND OUR HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS.

CIA MAINTAINS A WIDE VARIETY OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES. YOU HAVE ALREADY HEARD ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIPS CIA HAS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THROUGH THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD AND ITS COMMITTEES, AND THE DIRECTOR'S ROLE IN EVALUATION AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS. I HAVE MENTIONED THE COORDINATION OF COVERT COLLECTION OPERATIONS.

IN ADDITION, CERTAIN CIA COMPONENTS ARE CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATION OF SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OR ACTIVITIES. THESE INCLUDE THE OVERT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES MENTIONED EARLIER-

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SUCH REFERENCE SERVICES AS BIOGRAPHIC

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DATA ON FOREIGN PERSONALITIES EXCEPTING MILITARY FIGURES;
AND THE FOREIGN NAME TRACE REGISTER WHICH SUPPORTS ESPIONAGE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE WORK
THROUGHOUT THE GOVERNMENT.

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CIA, THROUGH

AGREEMENT WITH THE JCS, COOPERATES IN CERTAIN MILI
TARY PLANNING BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND AT THE UNIFIED

COMMAND LEVEL.

I THINK YOU CAN SEE FROM THESE EXAMPLES THAT MANY OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS ARE TWO-WAY STREETS, WITH ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FLOWING BOTH WAYS.

FINALLY, CIA HAS A WIDE NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE RECIPIENTS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES AND REPORTS. HERE I REFER TO BOTH INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF OTHER USIB AGENCIES AND TO CIA'S IN-HOUSE PRODUCTS. OUR TOP CUSTOMER IS, OF COURSE, THE PRESIDENT. HIS SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF CALL ON CIA FREQUENTLY—I SHOULD

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SAY, DAILY--WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF REQUESTS. SOME REQUIRE ONLY A REPLY BY SECURE TELEPHONE OR LDX. OTHERS MAY SET A NUMBER OF ANALYSTS TO BURNING THE MIDNIGHT OIL.

THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE AND THEIR DEPARTMENTS ARE ALSO MAJOR CONSUMERS OF INTELLIGENCE. THE NIES, SPECIAL NIES, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND CERTAIN RESEARCH STUDIES ARE IMPORTANT IN THIS RESPECT. I REFERRED EARLIER TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING PROJECTIONS WHICH WERE INITIATED TO MEET THE NEED OF SECDEF AND OSD PLANNERS.

OUR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS GIVE RISE TO MANY OTHER RELATIONSHIPS AND CONTACTS THROUGHOUT THE GOVERNMENT. As just one example, our Office of Economic Research Produces intelligence in support of the interagency group which maintains the watch on the flow of strategic goods and materials to the Communist Bloc.

ALTHOUGH CIA PRODUCES INTELLIGENCE FOR MANY DIFFERENT CUSTOMERS AND MAINTAINS A WIDE RANGE OF RELATIONSHIPS, CIA ADHERES TO THE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED RULE THAT THE ONLY ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IS ONE OF SUPPLYING OBJECTIVE, SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE. IT MAY BE HARD-FACT; IT MAY BE AN INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION—THE BEST JUDGMENT OF THE SITUATION; OR IT MAY BE ESTIMATIVE—AGAIN, A CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF HOW THE

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SITUATION IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP. BUT I WISH TO EM-PHASIZE THAT CIA DOES NOT MAKE NOR DOES IT ADVOCATE POLICY.

As you know, National Security Policy is formulated by the President with the advice of the National Security Council. The Director of Central Intelligence, since the NSC was created, has sat there as an invited guest and observer. He is, in fact, a participant, and frequently opens NSC meetings with an intelligence briefing. But he is there to support the decision—makers with intelligence, not to help make the actual decisions. As the President's principal intelligence officer, he gives advice when asked for it, but he is not there as an advocate of any particular policy.

LET ME NOTE IN PASSING THAT THIS RESTRICTION ALSO APPLIES TO THE HEADS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN RESPECT TO THEIR PARTICIPATION IN USIB DELIBERATIONS. A MAN WHO SITS IN USIB AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF AN AGENCY WITH A RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY FORMULATION MAY WELL LEAVE THE USIB CONFERENCE ROOM OUT AT CIA HEADQUARTERS IN LANGLEY, GO BACK TO HIS OWN OFFICE, AND ENGAGE IN A MEETING AT WHICH THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF HIS DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY ARE FORMULATED. AS LONG AS HE IS SITTING IN USIB, HOWEVER, HE IS NOT A POLICY MAKER.

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FINALLY, IF I MAY, I WANT TO DEVOTE A FEW MO-MENTS TO THE TYPES OF PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR THE CIA.

The fact of the matter is that James Bond and his colleagues of the spy movies and novels never worked there.

A COMMENTARY IN THE LONDON ECONOMIST LAST FALL, DISCUSSING THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, MAKES MY POINT PRETTY WELL WITH THIS SUMMARY: "MODERN INTELLIGENCE HAS TO DO WITH THE PAINSTAKING COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF FACT, THE EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT, AND CLEAR AND QUICK PRESENTATION. IT IS NOT SIMPLY WHAT SERIOUS JOURNALISTS WOULD ALWAYS PRODUCE IF THEY HAD TIME; IT IS SOMETHING MORE RIGOROUS, CONTINUOUS, AND ABOVE ALL OPERATIONAL—THAT IS TO SAY, RELATED TO SOMETHING THAT SOMEBODY WANTS TO DO OR MAY BE FORCED TO DO."

MUCH OF THE INFORMATION THAT WE USE IS HARDLY SECRET, COVERING SUCH PROSAIC MATTERS AS ECONOMIC STATISTICS, LEGAL CODES, SOCIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS, AND TRANSPORT FACILITIES. THE INFORMATION HAS TO BE ON HAND AGAINST THE CONTINGENCY THAT COUNTRY X, SEEMINGLY REMOTE AND OF LITTLE CURRENT CONCERN TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, MAY SOME DAY ERUPT ONTO OUR LIST OF CRITICAL SITUATIONS. AGAINST THAT DAY, WE MUST HAVE NOT ONLY THE INFORMATION, BUT THE EXPERIENCED

-20-SECRET AND KNOWLEDGEABLE EXPERTS TO INTERPRET AND APPLY IT.

TAKE THE RECENT VOTE IN FRENCH SOMALILAND, ON WHETHER TO REMAIN UNDER FRENCH RULE OR BECOME INDEPENDENT. WAS THIS OF NO CONCERN TO US? ETHI-OPIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA HAD EACH INDICATED A DETERMINATION TO SEIZE THE COLONY RATHER THAN LET IT FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE OTHER, IF THE FRENCH SHOULD SET THEIR SOMALILAND ADRIFT. THE UNITED STATES HAS A VERY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH ETHIOPIA, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION TRAINS, EQUIPS, AND ADVISES THE SOMALI ARMED FORCES. IF THERE IS, THEN, EVEN THE REMOTEST POSSIBILITY OF A DIRECT CONFRONTATION IN THIS AREA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, IT BEHOOVES US TO KNOW TODAY, NOT AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, SUCH MATTERS AS HARBOR FACILITIES IN DJIBOUTI, THE TERRAIN IN THE HINTER-LAND, THE CAPACITY OF THE RAILROAD, AND THE COMPOSI-TION OF THE POPULATION,

THE RESULT IS THAT THE CIA EMPLOYEE IS A MUCH MORE ACADEMIC MAN THAN THE PUBLIC REALIZES. WE MAY HAVE A FEW MEN WITH THE DEBONAIR APLOMB OF NAPOLEON Solo, THE MAN FROM UNCLE, BUT WE HAVE MORE THAN SENIOR PROFESSIONALS WITH 20 YEARS OR MORE, OF

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INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND. THREE QUARTERS OF OUR OFFICERS SPEAK AT LEAST ONE FOREIGN LANGUAGE. ABOUT
15 PERCENT HAVE GRADUATE DEGREES. SIX OUT OF EVERY
10 OF THE ANALYSTS WHO HAVE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY
AT HEADQUARTERS FOR ANALYSIS OF A FOREIGN AREA HAVE
LIVED, WORKED, OR TRAVELED ABROAD IN THAT AREA EVEN
BEFORE THEY CAME TO CIA.

When you combine all of the years required for graduate study, foreign experience, and then add 10 to 15 years of intelligence work, it adds up to an impressive depth of knowledge, competence, and expertise at the service of our Government.

WE COULD EASILY AND ADEQUATELY STAFF THE FACULTY OF A UNIVERSITY WITH OUR EXPERTS.

I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH YOU HOW THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SERVES THE GOVERNMENT. AND BRIEFLY, WHAT MANNER OF MAN WORKS THERE. I HAVE LEFT TO THE END ONE FINAL QUESTION: "WHY?"

FOR THE ANSWER, LET ME QUOTE A COUPLE OF OUT-

SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK IN DECEMBER 1965, TOLD A PUBLIC MEETING OF THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:

"I WOULD EMPHASIZE TO YOU THAT CIA IS NOT

-22-SECRET ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES NOT KNOWN TO THE SENIOR POLICY OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. BUT YOU SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT BENEATH THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION, THERE IS A TOUGH STRUGGLE GOING ON IN THE BACK ALLEYS ALL OVER THE WORLD. IT IS A TOUGH ONE, IT'S UNPLEASANT, AND NO ONE LIKES IT, BUT THAT IS NOT A FIELD WHICH CAN BE LEFT ENTIRELY TO THE OTHER SIDE. AND SO, ONCE IN A WHILE, SOME DISAGREEABLE THINGS HAPPEN, AND I CAN TELL YOU THAT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF GALLANTRY AND A HIGH DEGREE OF COMPETENCE IN THOSE WHO HAVE TO HELP US DEAL WITH THAT PART OF THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM."

IN APRIL 1965, PRESIDENT JOHNSON PUT IT THIS WAY: "WE HAVE COMMITTED OUR LIVES, OUR PROPERTY, OUR RESOURCES AND OUR SACRED HONOR TO THE FREEDOM AND PEACE OF OTHER MEN, INDEED, TO THE FREEDOM AND PEACE OF ALL MANKIND. WE WOULD DISHONOR THAT COMMITMENT, WE WOULD DISGRACE ALL THE SACRIFICES AMERICANS HAVE MADE, IF WE WERE NOT EVERY HOUR OF EVERY DAY VIGILANT AGAINST EVERY THREAT TO PEACE AND FREEDOM. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY."

PNIO + Nat Regs,
as well as NIRB

-23+ NIPE.

SECRET NSC, Ex Con, etc.?